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KNOWLEDGE, PRACTICAL REASONING 
AND ACTION 
Peter BAUMANN 
ABSTRACT: Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for 
acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, 
Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is 
positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form 
as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What 
matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and in all the 
cases discussed by the defenders of a strong link between knowledge and practical 
reasoning) is not so much knowledge but expected utility.  
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Several authors have recently argued that there is a close connection between 
knowledge and practical reasoning. Williamson for instance says: "One knows q iff 
q is an appropriate premise for one's practical reasoning."1 We can call this the 
“knowledge norm of practical reasoning”; for the sake of brevity we can refer to the 
claim as "the connection thesis." Stanley states that "one should act only on what 
one knows."2 Hawthorne agrees that knowledge of a proposition is necessary for 
using it as a premise in acceptable practical reasoning3; he adds that it is both 
necessary and sufficient.4 These kinds of claims are usually introduced by their 
defenders as intuitively plausible principles, supported by considerations and 
discussions of examples and cases,5 like, for instance, cases involving lotteries 
                                                                 
1 Timothy Williamson, “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of 
Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 231; see also Timothy Williamson, Knowledge 
and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 47. 
2 Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 9. 
3 See John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 29, 85, 174-175. 
4 See Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 30; see also Jonh Hawthorne, Jason Stanley, 
“Knowledge and Action,” The Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008): 571-590 and Jeremy Fantl, 
Matthew McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
The thesis can easily be extended to multi-premise reasoning; the premises would, according to 
the connection-thesis, count as acceptable for one’s practical reasoning as long as they are all 
known by the subject. 
5 See, e.g., Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 85, passim, and Stanley, Knowledge and 
Practical Interests, 9-10, passim. 
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(especially in the case of Hawthorne). The recent debate on this topic as a whole 
(see below) has also been very much driven by such considerations of plausibility. 
More systematic theoretical motivations for the connection thesis have been rare 
and if they play a role at all they are rather working in the background: 
Hawthorne’s and Stanley’s subject-sensitive invariantism6 goes very well with the 
connection thesis; for Williamson7 the connection thesis is part of a knowledge-
centered systematic epistemological theory. Apart from that, general dissatisfaction 
with expected utility accounts of practical reasoning (see below) might play some 
role in the background, too.8 
There are several problems with such claims about knowledge and practical 
reasoning – whether knowledge is deemed necessary or sufficient or both necessary 
and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and action.9 I will develop my 
objections step by step; most of them concern the necessity claim. I should stress 
from the beginning that I will follow the current debate on this topic and take 
“practical reasoning” to refer to instrumental reasoning here (if not indicated 
otherwise). 
1. The Main Example. The example most often used in support of the 
connection thesis has to do with lotteries.10 Hawthorne gives the example of 
                                                                 
6 See Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries and Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests. 
7 See Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits. 
8 Some might want to argue that being in a position to know p is necessary and sufficient for using 
p as a premise in acceptable practical reasoning. Alternatively, one might want to claim that 
being justified in believing p (or holding a justified true belief in p?) is the relevant condition. 
One would have to see the specific arguments for such claims; these arguments will be 
sufficiently different from the ones presented for the connection thesis. Hence, we should leave 
such related claims aside here.  
9 To be sure, acceptable practical reasoning has to meet further conditions (see John Hawthorne, 
Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” The Journal of Philosophy 105 (2008): 578). This might 
make the search for sufficient conditions more difficult than the search for necessary 
conditions. For the sake of simplicity and because nothing hinges on it here, I will disregard 
concerns with these additional conditions. – It is very plausible to say (see Hawthorne, Stanley, 
“Knowledge and Action,” 572) that if a person ought to have known a certain proposition and 
taken it into account in her practical reasoning but is in fact ignorant of its truth and thus does 
not take it into account, then her practical reasoning is defect; however, this does not show that 
it is the knowledge of the proposition she is missing here rather than, say, the justified belief in 
it; apart from that, there are, of course, also many cases where the subject is ignorant of the 
truth of a proposition without there being any “obligation” to know its truth. For the sake of 
simplicity, I will leave cases of justified ignorance aside here.  
10 Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 571-574 present several further cases in favour 
of their view. I won’t go into them because they don’t add anything new here.  
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someone who's been offered a penny for his lottery ticket. The person reasons as 
follows: 
"The ticket is a loser. 
So if I keep the ticket I will get nothing. 
But if I sell the ticket I will get a penny. 
So I'd better sell the ticket."11 
Hawthorne claims that it is "clear enough" that this is a piece of bad reasoning and 
that "ordinary folk" agree with that. They would also agree that it is bad reasoning 
because the first premise is not known.12  
First of all, it is not obvious that one can under no circumstances know a 
“lottery proposition” like the first premise of the quoted piece of practical 
reasoning.13 The problem Hawthorne's book14 is dedicated to15 shows why this is 
not so clear: If I know that I will never be rich (which seems plausible) and if I also 
know that this entails that I won't win the lottery, then how could I not know that 
I won't win the lottery? I don’t want to go into this difficult problem here but only 
point out that it is no trivial claim at all that one cannot know a lottery proposition. 
It is also not obvious – as we will see in more detail below (section 5) – which 
pieces of reasoning are good or bad and why.16 
                                                                 
11 Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 29; see also 85.  
12 See Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 29-30; see also Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and 
Action,” 571-572.  
13 See Stephen Hetherington, Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge. On Two Dogmas of 
Epistemology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 102-107; Peter Baumann, "Lotteries and 
Contexts," Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 415-428.  
14 Knowledge and Lotteries.  
15 See originally Gilbert Harman, Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 161.  
16 See also Rhys McKinnon, “Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning,” Logos & Episteme 2 
(2011): 225-231 who points out that Hawthorne and others need to make sure that the 
reasoning in a lottery case like the one above  is bad not just because it violates principles of 
expected utility (see below). – What makes people say that the kind of reasoning discussed by 
Hawthorne, Stanley and others is bad? Here are two weaker but not unpopular arguments 
which I want to discuss briefly just to get them out of the way. First, someone might imagine 
that the person first bought a ticket in the expectation that it might win and then decided to sell 
it in the expectation that it will lose. In this case, the person – if she has not simply changed her 
mind – has incoherent expectations. Incoherence would then be the problem but not the lack of 
knowledge of a premise of the practical reasoning – the connection thesis does not seem 
relevant here. Apart from that, this kind of incoherence would not show that the practical 
reasoning leading to the selling of the ticket itself is bad; the incoherence would rather be 
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Let me begin with some rather straightforward objections against the 
connection thesis (sections 2-4) before discussing it in the light of an alternative 
view (sections 5-7).  
2. Gettierization. Let us start with a point which is important enough to 
stress right at the beginning. If knowledge of a proposition is necessary for its use in 
acceptable practical reasoning, then gettierized subjects cannot engage in acceptable 
practical reasoning. But this does not seem plausible at all.17 Compare Bo and Ben. 
Bo sees herself confronted with a raging bull. She comes to know there is a bull, 
engages in some swift practical reasoning and decides to run. Ben, however, finds 
himself, unknowingly, in raging bull facade county (where the locals frighten 
strangers with their exquisite raging bull facades). As it happens, he really is 
confronted with a raging bull. Given the circumstances, he doesn’t come to know 
that.18 Despite lack of knowledge, he engages in some swift practical reasoning and 
                                                                      
between two different pieces of practical reasoning (the one leading to the buying of the ticket 
and the other leading to the selling of it). 
   Second, in discussion philosophers supporting the connection thesis often ask "So, if you decide 
to sell it – why did you buy it in the first place?" If this is not the incoherence charge again, 
then it can be taken either as the charge that there is no good reason to buy a lottery ticket in 
the first place (“and are you not admitting this yourself by deciding to sell it?”); or it can be 
taken as the charge that there is no good reason to sell it, once bought (“and are you not 
admitting this yourself by having bought it?”). On the first charge: There are many reasons to 
buy lottery tickets. If one can get emotionally involved while watching a movie knowing that it 
is all fictional, then why not get excited in a similar way about the slim prospects of winning a 
lottery? People have all kinds of reasons for buying lottery tickets and these reasons can be bad 
but they need not be. Furthermore, people’s reasons and the quality of their reasons need not 
have anything to do with whether they know that their ticket will win or lose. On the second 
charge: Why not sell a lottery ticket? Some people do that even as their profession (whether or 
not they buy them in the first place) and there seems nothing wrong with it as such. Or is it 
specifically because one does not know that it will lose? This question leads us back to the main 
issue and requires more than just the raising of a rhetorical question ("So, if you decide to sell it 
– why did you buy it in the first place?"). 
17 See also E.J. Coffman, Old Dog Does New Tricks, Ms., 2007; Jessica Brown, “Subject-Sensitive 
Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning,” Noûs 42 (2008): 167-189, sec.5; 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22; Mikkel Gerken, “Warrant and Action,” Synthese 178 
(2011): 535-6.  
18 See Alvin I. Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” in his Liaisons. Philosophy 
Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (Cambridge & London: MIT Press, 1992), 86 for this 
kind of example as well as Clayton Littlejohn, “Must We Act Only on What We Know?” The 
Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 464-5, 469, and Ram Neta, “Treating Something as a Reason 
for Action,” Noûs 43 (2009): 687-688 who use it in a similar way than we do here; the argument 
here can be easily applied to all kinds of Gettier-cases.  
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decides to run. It seems implausible to assume that Bo's but not Ben's practical 
reasoning is fine because Bo but not Ben knows that there is a raging bull in the 
vicinity.  
Gettierized belief in the narrow, original sense of the term19 is justified true 
belief which does not amount to knowledge. Given the great variety of Gettier-like 
examples and the controversial nature of the notion of justification it might be 
better to use a broader notion of gettierized belief. In that sense, a belief is 
gettierized just in case it is true but does not constitute knowledge and this by no 
epistemic mistake of the subject. Epistemically blameless true belief which does not 
amount to knowledge is gettierized belief (in the broad sense). This explanation 
suggests that there need not be anything wrong with the practical reasoning of such 
a gettierized subject: If the subject fails to know the relevant proposition by no 
epistemic mistake of their own, then why should we blame them for their practical 
reasoning which is based on the relevant proposition? Sure, one would want to 
point out to the subject that she did not know what she seemed to know or that 
what seemed to be true is not in fact true; however, there is no reason to take this 
as a criticism of the subject’s reasoning (how could she have done better?). 
Knowledge thus does not seem to be necessary for acceptable practical reasoning. 
One might want to object and argue that in such cases the subject is really violating 
a rule, though blamelessly. Lack of justified blame and the presence of good 
excuses, one could point out, do not entail that the rule of reasoning has not been 
violated. Since similar points will come up in the next two sections, I will reply to 
this kind of objection at the end of section 4.20 
3. Truth. Is even the truth of a proposition necessary for the acceptability of 
using it in practical reasoning? Consider the following two cases. Jill is close to 
                                                                 
19 See Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123.  
20 One might also hold that the Gettier-objection only works against the connection thesis if one 
assumes in addition that the concept of knowledge can be reductively defined in terms of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions; according to this idea, it does not work 
against someone like Williamson who holds that the concept of knowledge cannot be 
reductively defined (see Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits). I disagree. While it is true that 
Gettier cases are a problem only for reductive definitions of knowledge, it is also true that they 
pose a problem for any defender of the connection thesis. Defenders of reductive as well as of 
non-reductive accounts of knowledge can easily agree that there are gettierized subjects (that is, 
subjects who meet certain conditions while lacking knowledge); thus, the question whether 
such subjects are entitled to use the believed proposition as a premise for practical reasoning 
even if they don’t know it makes a lot of sense for both parties. Williamson, for instance, agrees, 
too, that there are Gettier cases; he thus needs to answer the Gettier-objection above like 
everyone else. 
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dying of thirst when she finds some water. She comes to know it is water and 
engages in some quick practical deliberation: 
This is water. 
If I drink this, I will survive. 
If I don't drink this, I will die. 
So, I better drink this. 
She drinks the water and survives. Jack, however, has recently travelled to twin 
earth but doesn't know about the differences between earth and twin earth.21 He 
finds himself in a situation identical to Jill's as far as the subject’s perspective is 
concerned. However, what he takes to be water is really something different, 
namely t-water. Fortunately, t-water is as good for survival as water. Jack engages 
in some quick practical deliberation: 
This is water. 
If I drink this, I will survive. 
If I don't drink this, I will die. 
So, I better drink this. 
He drinks the t-water and survives. Should we really say that there is something 
wrong with Jack's practical reasoning but not with Jill's because Jill knows that 
there is water whereas Jack's belief that there is water is not even true? This does 
not seem plausible.22 True belief does not seem necessary for acceptable practical 
reasoning based on that belief; it follows that knowledge is also not necessary. 
Perhaps Hume was right after all and belief (and desire) is all we need for an 
account of good practical reasoning? Again, one might object that all this only 
shows that the subject is blameless and excused but not that no rule of practical 
reasoning has been violated. I will get back to this kind of point at the end of the 
next section.  
4. KK. What if S knows that p but does not know that he knows that p? 
Suppose S is unsure and does not know whether he knows that p (see Radford 
1966). Assuming that this is compatible with S's knowledge that p, S could have a 
                                                                 
21 See Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” in his Mind, Language and Reality. 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 215-271; if one 
does not like the semantic externalism involved in the example one can easily modify it by 
replacing reference to t-water by reference to some liquid indistinguishable from water.  
22 See also Trent Dougherty, Knowledge and Context-Sensitive Norms: A Defense of Simple 
Moderate Invariantism, Ms., 2007.  
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good reason not to simply act on the proposition that p. Sure, if “not acting” is not a 
serious alternative, that is, if not acting on any proposition relevant to the practical 
issue at hand were to risk bringing about very bad consequences, then S ought to 
act on some proposition, and if the proposition that p seems more likely to be true 
than any alternative proposition, then S ought to act on the proposition that p. 
However, this might not be the case: “Not acting” might be unproblematic or better 
than acting on a proposition that “might,” according to S’s worries, turn out to be 
false; apart from that, there could also be competing propositions which seem to S 
more likely to be true. In such cases, the subject does not have a good reason to act 
on the proposition that p and even has a good reason not to act on the proposition 
that p. Paul might know that the answer to the 1 Million Pound question is 
"Teheran." However, he is cautious and really not sure whether he knows that: 
Didn’t he make bad mistakes about geography before? Suppose Paul can ask a friend 
about this. In such circumstances he should not simply go ahead and give "Teheran" 
as his final answer. Knowledge of a proposition is thus not sufficient for its use in 
good practical reasoning (see fn.1 above). Would knowledge that one knows be? 
Perhaps – but that thesis is much stronger and much less interesting.23 
What about the reverse case where someone (by no mistake of their own) 
does not know that p but has very good reasons to think they know that p? One can 
think of cases of gettierization here or of cases like the above one about water. Isn’t 
it acceptable then to act on a proposition which is not known (whether that 
proposition is true or false)? Even if the practical stakes of getting it right are very 
high – which would be relevant to the case of an unknown false proposition), the 
subject ought not go by anything but their best reasons; if these reasons suggest that 
p, then S ought to act on p. If that is correct, then knowledge is not necessary for 
good practical reasoning.  
Hawthorne and Stanley discuss such cases24 and propose that they are not 
counter-examples to the connection thesis (or what they call the ”knowledge-rule”) 
but rather cases where the subject has a good excuse and thus deserves no blame for 
violating the rule. This kind of reply can also be used against the cases mentioned in 
the last two sections.  
                                                                 
23 Williamson, “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” sec.V briefly discusses the 
appropriateness of practical reasoning from a known premise when one does not know that one 
knows the relevant proposition; however, what he proposes here (appropriateness depending 
on and varying with subject’s stakes) does not solve the problem above for the straightforward 
connection thesis. I will therefore not further go into this here.  See also a brief remark in 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig, “Against Pragmatic Encroachment,” Logos & Episteme 2 (2011): 80-1. 
24 Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 573, 586; see also Neta, “Treating Something,” 
688-9. 
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However, there is a general methodological problem with this kind of reply: 
Can’t one always say that? Or at least way too often? Hawthorne and Stanley don’t 
make it clear how one can distinguish between a counter-example to the 
knowledge-rule and the case of an excused violation of the rule. Hawthorne and 
Stanley use this kind of reply – the interpretation of what might at first sight look 
like a counter-example as a mere excusable violation of their rule – quite often.25 
Without further arguments to the contrary, one is entitled to at least let it cut both 
ways: While Hawthorne and Stanley might say that something is an excusable 
violation of their rule, the sceptic about the connection thesis seems to have at least 
as much reason to see it as a counter-example. I don’t want to put too much weight 
on this point and rather leave it at that; however, this should already raise some 
doubts about the connection thesis.26 
But wouldn’t we, after discovering that our belief in some premise was 
gettierized or that we were mistaken about what it is that we refer to or that we 
were wrong about our epistemic states (see this and the last two sections), criticize 
our reasoning as inadequate? And wouldn’t that show that knowledge is required 
for appropriate practical reasoning after all? I don’t think so. Even if one 
acknowledged this kind of “drawback” one wouldn’t have to concede and should in 
fact not concede that there was something wrong with one’s original reasoning: 
there wasn’t anything wrong with that. The gettierized person might find herself 
lucky when noticing that she had been gettierized but she would not have any 
reason to see her practical reasoning itself as deficient. Sure, she might concede that 
the basis of her reasoning was not as good and solid as she thought; but even then 
she would be right to insist that there was nothing wrong with her reasoning as 
such, given that there was nothing she could have done to improve the basis of her 
reasoning. Similar things hold for subjects who are mistaken about referents or 
about their epistemic state (see above). Even if the premises on which her reasoning 
were based turned out to be false, she ought not to accept blame for her reasoning 
itself.  
5. An Alternative: Expected Utility. Consider again the original piece of 
practical reasoning:  
(Case 1) 
The ticket is a loser. 
                                                                 
25 Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 585-586 also remark that our intuitions about 
what constitutes a counter-example and what not are unclear in cases of failure of luminosity 
where one is in a particular (mental) state without knowing that one is. 
26 For more on excuses see Gerken, “Warrant and Action,” 537-544. 
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So if I keep the ticket I will get nothing. 
But if I sell the ticket I will get a penny. 
So I'd better sell the ticket. 27 
Why is it bad? Is it because the first premise in not known? Or is it for some 
other reason?  
Compare (Case 1) with another case. John finds a lottery ticket with the 
number 666 on the street. He knows a crazy collector of items with the number 666 
on them who will offer him $5,000 for the ticket. He reasons in the following way: 
(Case 2) 
The ticket is a loser. 
So if I keep the ticket I will get nothing. 
But if I sell the ticket I will get $ 5,000. 
So I'd better sell the ticket. 
What if, in addition, John did not find the ticket but was paid a good sum by the 
former owner of the ticket to take it because he thought that keeping a ticket with 
that number will bring terrible bad luck? Hawthorne remarks in a footnote28 – 
without further argument – that it doesn't make a difference whether the ticket 
was free or not; I find it hard to see how this could not make a difference. 
Finally, Hawthorne himself briefly mentions the case of a 10,000 ticket 
lottery with a $5,000 prize where one ticket costs a cent. It would be irrational "to 
decline [buying a ticket] on the basis of your 'knowledge' that the ticket will lose."29 
Here is the reasoning for this case: 
(Case 3) 
That ticket is a loser. 
So if I buy the ticket I will get nothing. 
But if I don’t buy the ticket I will keep one 1 cent. 
So I'd better not buy the ticket. 
(Case 1) and (Case3) strike us as cases of bad practical reasoning while (Case 
2) is not so bad if not quite good. Why is that? All the cases share the same logical 
form.  
                                                                 
27 See Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 29. 
28 See Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 29, fn. 74. 
29 Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 85. 
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We get closer to an answer if we make the relevant implicit assumptions 
about odds and stakes explicit. In (Case 1) and (Case 2) we can assume that the 
subject owns a ticket with a minute chance of winning (say 1 out of 1 Million) 
while the chances are much better in case (3) (1 out of 10 000). Let us assume the 
prize in (Case 1) and (Case 2) is 10 000 Dollars.  
It is tempting to use Expected Utility Theory to analyse such cases and 
interpret them as cases of expected utility reasoning.. The basic idea is that in cases 
like the above ones appropriate practical reasoning identifies from the feasible set of 
available acts the act with the highest expected utility (whether it is explicitly 
guided by this idea or not). Given a finite and exhaustive set of mutually exclusive 
set of circumstances c1 … cn,30 given further a utility function U of the subject 
which maps the outcome of each act in a given circumstance to a (measurable) 
utility u1 … un, and given, finally, a probability function P of the subject which 
assigns each circumstance or outcome a certain probability p1 … pn, the expected 
utility EU of an act A can be characterized as the sum p1 x u1 + … pn x un. Or:  
EU = ∑i pi x ui 
Given EU, we cannot represent practical reasoning any more in the form 
used above, namely simply as deductive inferences from given premises to a 
conclusion. Otherwise we could not explain why the pieces of reasoning differ in 
quality, given that they share the same logical form. Rather, we have to take into 
account that the reasoner has different credences in the different propositions. This, 
together with the different utilities, explains why the reasoning is good in one case 
and bad in the two other cases above.  
Let us apply this idea to our 3 cases. For the sake of simplicity we may 
assume that the scale of the subject’s utilities for money can be mapped by a 
positive linear transformation onto the scale of monetary values (nothing hinges on 
this simplification). Then the expected utility of keeping the ticket in (Case 1) is 
1/100 expected Dollars; the expected utility of selling the ticket is also 1/100 
expected Dollars. Both acts have the same expected utility and there is thus no 
reason (ceteris paribus) to prefer one to the other, given the theory. For this reason, 
the inference to the conclusion of (Case 1) is not a good one. 
In (Case 2) the expected utility of keeping the ticket is, 1/100 expected 
Dollars while the expected utility of selling the ticket is 5000 expected Dollars. So, 
selling looks like the rational thing to do. 
                                                                 
30 If the set is infinite, things are more complicated; fortunately, the assumption of finite sets is 
unproblematic here and nothing hinges on it.  
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In (Case 3), finally, the expected utility of not buying a ticket is 0 Cents while 
the expected utility of buying a ticket is 49 expected Cents. Hence, it would be 
foolish not to buy a ticket.  
According to the connection thesis, all 3 pieces of practical reasoning are bad 
because some premise is unknown. According to Expected Utility-Theory, the first 
and last case (1, 3) are cases of bad reasoning while the middle case (2) is a case of 
good reasoning. In cases like these, Expected Utility-Theory seems to give the 
correct answers while the connection thesis doesn’t.31 
Here is another case Hawthorne brings up: 
"I will be going to Blackpool next year. 
So I won't die beforehand. 
So I ought to wait until next year before buying life insurance."32   
Given that the life insurance offers a reasonable deal, this is an example of bad 
reasoning. But, again, the reason it is bad is that it goes against the expected utilities 
and not the lack of knowledge of the premises of the inference (I leave it to the 
reader to go through the numbers for particular examples). Similarly, there are 
perfectly acceptable pieces of reasoning in favour of buying life insurance, even if 
the subject does not know the relevant premises of her reasoning. While the 
connection thesis excludes certain propositions from acceptable practical reasoning, 
namely the unknown ones, the principle of expected utility is much more liberal 
and accepts them all; the constraints of the latter view rather concern the question 
how one ought to use a proposition (namely according to Expected Utility-Theory) 
rather than whether to use it.33 
6. Expected Utility versus Knowledge? But is it really true that practical 
reasoning guided by the idea of maximizing expected utility does not require 
                                                                 
31 I say “seems” because I have not offered a formal argument that Expected Utility-Theory always 
gives the right results in such cases. However, plausibility is enough for my purposes here, 
given that the main aim of this paper is to argue against a view and not so much for an 
alternative.  
32 Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 175; see also Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and 
Action,” 571.  
33 On expected-utility accounts as alternatives see also the brief remarks in Hawthorne, Stanley, 
“Knowledge and Action,” 580-585, Richard Feldman, “Knowledge and Lotteries,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 222-225, Alan Goldman, “Knowledge, Explanation, 
and Lotteries,” Noûs 42 (2008): 471-472, Igor Douven, “Knowledge and Practical Reasoning,” 
Dialectica 62 (2008): 101-118, and Richard Fumerton, “Fencing Out Pragmatic Encroachment,” 
Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 247; for acceptable reasoning using unknown lottery 
propositions see also Littlejohn,  “Must We Act,” 471-472.  
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knowledge of its premises? Expected Utility-reasoning can also be characterized 
informally by the following schema (restricted here, for the sake of simplicity, to 
the case of 2 feasible acts): 
(1) I can do A1 or A2. 
(2) Given the possible circumstances and outcomes, A1 has higher expected utility 
than A2. 
(C) Hence, I should do A1.34 
Or, more briefly (and very roughly): 
Doing A1 is the best means for the attainment of my ends. 
Hence, I should do A1. 
Does acceptable practical reasoning along such lines require that one knows 
one’s feasible set of acts, the set of possible circumstances of action and the different 
outcomes of given acts in given circumstances (instead of having some belief about 
this which falls short of knowledge)? Since there are many cases where we engage 
in acceptable practical reasoning and since we often do not know these things, it 
seems very plausible to assume that the acceptability of practical reasoning does not 
require knowledge of these things. In other words, acceptable practical reasoning is 
compatible with lack of knowledge of at least some of its premises. I won’t go more 
into lack of knowledge of one’s options, circumstances and outcomes here because 
the point just made seems very plausible; it is uncontroversial (or not even an issue) 
in the debate on the connection thesis.  
But what about probabilities and utilities? Doesn’t acceptable practical 
reasoning require knowledge of at least them? We have seen that knowledge of the 
premises in cases like (Case1), (Case 2) and (Case 3) are not required. This is already 
an interesting result concerning the standard form in which practical inferences are 
usually presented by defenders of the connection thesis. But can’t we restrict and 
reformulate the connection thesis and claim that acceptable practical reasoning 
though not requiring knowledge of all of its premises still does require knowledge 
of some premises, namely of those stating probabilities and utilities?  
Let us take the case of utilities first. It is quite plausible, I think, to assume 
that agents often have mistaken views about or are ignorant of some of their 
utilities. However, even in such cases acceptable practical reasoning seems possible. 
Suppose I wonder whether I should spend the evening out with friends or rather 
                                                                 
34 Sometimes it is said that the conclusion of a practical inference is an action rather than a 
proposition; we can leave this complication aside here.  
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alone at home.35 I reason in the light of what I take to be best for me. Suppose that I 
assume on the basis of good evidence (about myself) but falsely that it would be 
better for me to stay home alone tonight. Still, my reasoning that I should stay 
home alone strikes me as good while any reasoning resulting (on the same basis) in 
the conclusion that I should go out would appear unmotivated and foolish even if 
this option would really be better for me. To know one’s own utilities is certainly 
an important advantage but it seems forced to say that it is also a necessary 
condition for acceptable practical reasoning. 
I don’t want to pursue the issue of knowledge of one’s utilities any futher 
here but rather, finally, go into knowledge of probabilities. This is a topic defenders 
of the connection thesis have commented upon – while they haven’t said much if 
anything about knowledge of utilities. 
Stanley points out that even if one is dealing with probabilities (or expected 
utilities) in one's practical reasoning, one still needs knowledge, namely knowledge 
of those probabilities36). Take an agent who's deliberating about the question 
whether they should buy a ticket in a 10 ticket lottery with a $10,000 prize for just 
one cent. If this reasoning is acceptable, then the agent knows the relevant 
probabilities, so the idea.  
But does she really have to get the probabilities right in order for her 
reasoning to count as a good practical reasoning? Suppose both Ann and Barbara 
have received exactly the same information about some lotteries, – Ann about a lottery 
she is considering and Barbara about a different lottery she is considering. Suppose 
further that they both have no reason to be suspicious about the information. The 
only difference is that in Ann's case the information is correct whereas in Barbara's 
case it is incorrect. Should we really be so "externalist" about practical reasoning as 
to say that Ann’s but not Barbara’s practical reasoning is good because only Ann but 
not Barbara knows the probabilities? This defence of the connection thesis against 
the expected utility objection comes at a high prize: One would have to accept a 
very controversial theory of practical reasoning, namely externalism (the idea that 
the quality of practical reasoning is, at least partly, determined by factors which 
might not be accessible to the subject; defenders of the connection thesis have not 
                                                                 
35 See, e.g., Friedrich Waismann, “Ethics and the Will,” in Friedrich Waismann, Josef Schächter, 
Moritz Schlick, Ethics and the Will. Essays, eds. Brian McGuinness and Joachim Schulte 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 53-137, sec.17 for the issue and similar examples.  
36 See Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests, 10, Jason Stanley, “Replies to Gilbert Harman, 
Ram Neta, and Stephen Schiffer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 203-
206, and Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 581-585.  
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offered any argument to this conclusion).37 Apart from that, the theory would 
demand a lot from deliberators, namely knowledge about (objective) probabilities. 
But are probabilities “out there” for us to know? The defence discussed here thus 
comes with a lot of substantial commitments on other topics: One has to accept not 
only a strong externalism about practical reasoning but also a particular, controversial 
view of probability. This in itself speaks against this defence manoeuvre. 
Perhaps those who want to make this kind of move should then rather think 
of probabilities as subjective or as epistemic (this is Hawthorne’s and Stanley’s 
move38). However, if one does that, it becomes unclear why the agent has to know 
their probabilities and why it is not sufficient just to rely on them (e.g., as her 
betting dispositions). Her behaviour would then just express his probabilities 
(together with her utilities). Furthermore, in this case the move towards probabilities 
seems besides the point. Knowledge of the probabilities wouldn't be knowledge of 
external facts, about the world rather than the agent; however, knowledge of the 
world (and not of one’s own mind) would be what is needed in practical reasoning 
if knowledge of any interesting kind is needed at all.  
Hawthorne and Stanley offers a reply to this objection.39 Suppose my epistemic 
probability that the restaurant is on the left is .6 because 3 out of 5 persons I asked 
told me so. Then I can deliberate and act on the known proposition that 3 out of 5 
persons told me it’s on the left, and I don’t need to act on the known epistemic 
probabilities. It is very doubtful whether this reply helps Hawthorne and Stanley. 
Why is my knowledge that 3 out of 5 persons told me the restaurant is on the left 
relevant to the question whether I should go right or left – if not because it implies 
something about or simply reduces to a belief about the relevant probabilities? So, 
we’re back with knowledge of probabilities. 
To summarize: If the defenders of the connection thesis refer to objective 
probabilities, then they run into serious problems (see above); if they only talk 
about knowledge of subjective or epistemic probabilities, then the connection thesis 
loses most of its bite: The knowledge necessary or sufficient for good practical 
reasoning would be about subjective or epistemic states and not about facts in the 
external world – which is what the knowledge relevant to the connection thesis 
should be about if the thesis is supposed to be interesting.40  
                                                                 
37 To be sure, it is “better” to know the probabilities than not to know but this does not entail that 
there is something wrong with the reasoning of the unknowing subject.  
38 In Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 584-585.  
39 Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 584-585.  
40 See Stephen Schiffer, “Interest-Relative Invariantism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 75 (2007): 188-195, sec.1; Schiffer also points out that the subject need not have any 
concepts of probability.   
Knowledge, Practical Reasoning and Action 
21 
The upshot of all this is that appropriate practical reasoning does not require 
knowledge of the premises of inferences like the ones in (Case 1), (Case 2) or (Case 
3). It also turned out that the usual representation of practical reasoning in these 
kinds of cases is a bit elliptical and needs to be reformulated, namely, as we say, in 
terms of expected utilities. An alternative view of practical reasoning as based on 
the idea of expected utility accounts better for our judgments about good and bad 
practical reasoning. This view also allows for acceptable practical reasoning without 
knowledge of the premises. (We should always remember that “practical reasoning” 
refers to instrumental reasoning here). 
Sure, no practical reasoner is ever completely wrong or ignorant about all the 
facts relevant to her reasoning. And perhaps some knowledge of some propositions 
is required for practical reasoning. For instance, a practical reasoner who does not 
know some basic facts about how actions intervene in the worlds cannot count as a 
good practical reasoner. Conceding this is, however, far from agreeing with the 
much stronger connection thesis or the claim that good practical reasoning requires 
knowledge by the subject of all the propositions used as premises in their reasoning.  
I have focused here very much on expected utility and there are several 
objections one might raise against this view. There are other, non-maximizing, 
conceptions of practical reasoning. “Satisficing” views, for instance, hold that enough 
is enough and that one need not or should not maximize goods.41  However, similar 
points can be made, mutatis mutandis, on the basis of these kinds of views. They 
also don’t entail or support the connection thesis. I won’t go into any detail here.  
There are also choice situations where the subject has no idea concerning the 
relevant probabilities. In such cases, Expected Utility-Theory is inapplicable. It is 
not clear42 whether there are any principles or rules of good practical reasoning for 
such cases and, if so, which ones (Maximin?). This kind of case, however, does not 
seem to help the defender of the connection thesis much, given that subjects know 
even less here than in the cases considered above. What about the other extreme, 
namely cases where the subject is certain about the outcomes of given acts in given 
circumstances? These cases also don’t give the connection thesis any advantage over 
Expected-Utility-theory; the only relevant difference here is that the probabilities 
for the circumstances go up to 1 in one case and down to 0 in all other cases. It is 
interesting to notice that the defenders of the connection thesis typically present as 
                                                                 
41 See Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), Michael A. Slote, 
Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational Choice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less (New York: ECCO, 2004).   
42 See the overview in Michael Resnik, Choices. An Introduction to Decision Theory 
(Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), ch. 2.   
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cases of bad reasoning cases where the subject has some idea about the probabilities. 
The argument above, if it stands, seems sufficient against the connection thesis.  
There are other principles or rules of good practical reasoning which often 
converge with Expected Utility-principles, like, e.g., the principle of dominance.43 
An act A dominates another act B just in case under no circumstance is the outcome 
of A worse than the outcome of B and under some circumstance it is better. The 
principle of dominance says that one should choose the acts which dominate all 
other feasible acts in a given situation of choice. Obviously, this principle is 
compatible with the lack of knowledge of all premises of the practical inference. 
There is no need to go into the details here. I will rather continue by illustrating 
the advantage of Expected Utility-theory over the connection thesis a bit more.  
7. Additional Considerations. I would like to end by adding some further 
considerations against the connection thesis. The main weight lies on what has 
been said above but what follows should also be taken into account. I will discuss 
extreme stakes (a), further explanatory advantages of expected utility accounts (b) 
and end with some brief remarks on implications for epistemological scepticism and 
moral cognitivism (c). 
(a) Considerations of extreme lotteries (or, more generally: of situations 
where very much is at stake) add further reasons to doubt the connection thesis. It 
is worth going into it briefly. Again, this rather supports the idea that it is expected 
utility and not knowledge that matters for practical reasoning.44 Consider a 100 
billion ticket lottery with a $100,000 prize; you got your ticket for free but have the 
chance of selling it for $90,000. It would be foolish not to sell the ticket even if you 
don’t know that it won’t win. This suggests that knowledge of a proposition is not 
necessary for acceptable practical reasoning based on that proposition.45  Or take 
something you know for certain, like "if it rains, then it rains." It would still be 
foolish to bet your life on it, at least in normal circumstances (if you think that one 
                                                                 
43 As is well known, plausible principles of practical reasoning can conflict with each other. 
Newcomb’s paradox is one very well-known case where the principle of dominance conflicts 
(or seems to conflict) with a principle of maximizing expected utility (see, e.g., Robert Nozick, 
“Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice,” in his Socratic Puzzles (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997), 45-73. 
44 See Stewart Cohen, “Knowledge, Assertion, and Practical Reasoning,” Philosophical Issues 14 
(2004), 487; Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 148; Brian Weatherson, “Can We Do 
without Pragmatic Encroachment?” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005): 438-440; Dougherty, 
Knowledge and Context-Sensitive Norms; Schiffer “Interest-Relative Invariantism,” sec.1; Brown, 
“Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” sec.7; Janet Levin, “Assertion, Practical Reasoning, and Pragmatic 
Theories of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2008): 377-380.   
45 See also Levin, “Assertion, Practical Reasoning,” 377-380.   
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should assume probability 1 for logical tautologies and should bet everything in 
such cases of maximal certainty, then you should modify the example and consider 
a case where the probabilities are extremely high but still below 1). This suggests 
that knowledge of a proposition is also not sufficient for the legitimate use of it in 
practical reasoning.46  Expected Utility accounts, in contrast, have no problem at all 
accounting for such cases. 
Hawthorne shortly mentions the last point and makes the following remark, 
sketching a response: "... we should consider whether knowledge of any proposition 
can be destroyed by environments in which a suitable bet is offered. One option, of 
course, is to think that the sketched connection between knowledge and practical 
reasoning is only roughly correct."47 Let us leave the latter option (“One option …”) 
aside here: One would have to spell out in detail in what ways this is only roughly 
correct and how it could be modified; since this has not been done yet, this idea is 
hard to discuss. Consider rather the first idea: If the stakes are high enough, then 
the person does not know the relevant proposition (e.g., that if it rains, it rains). 
How good is that reply? Well, it will be attractive to those who like Hawthorne or 
Stanley (but not Williamson) hold that knowledge depends on what is at stake for 
the subject. It won't cut much ice for those who don't accept that theory.48 So, the 
dialectical weight of this rejoinder is limited.49 Apart from that, it is hard anyway to 
imagine circumstances in which “If it rains, then it rains” would become 
unknown.50 
                                                                 
46 See for a different argument here: Thomas M. Crisp, “Hawthorne on Knowledge and Practical 
Reasoning,” Analysis 65 (2005): 138-140, Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, “On Pragmatic 
Encroachment in Epistemology,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2007): 558-
589, and the remarks in Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism. Knowledge, Skepticism, 
and Context, vol.1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 252-254, 262-268; also see fn. 4 above.    
47 Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 177, fn.37.    
48 See also Brown, “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” sec.7.    
49 See also the discussion in Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 587-589 where the 
authors do not commit themselves to a particular strategy against the objection above.    
50 One further criticism of the idea that an agent might know that p but still not be entitled to act 
on what they know says that this would allow even a knowing agent to further check the 
evidence. However, to say something like "I know she'll be at the party but let me check!" 
sounds weird (see Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 148-149). Does it really? (see Brown, 
“Subject-Sensitive Invariantism,” sec.7, Jennifer Lackey, “Acting on Knowledge,” Philosophical 
Perspectives 24 (2010): 361-382 but also Neta, “Treating Something,” 697.) What about the 
surgeon who claims to know that he is supposed to take out the appendix but decides to check 
the file again, “just in case”? Even if it does sound weird to say something like “I know she'll be 
at the party but let me check!": It does not seem to be relevant here. In the case of “If it rains, 
then it rains” we might not even be able to think of further evidence one could check. And 
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(b) Compare two pieces of knowledge. Suppose you know some very complex 
proposition about elementary particles and you also know that you exist now. You 
would certainly bet much more on the latter than on the former. This in itself does 
not show that knowledge isn't necessary for practical reasoning but it suggests at 
least that something else, the subject’s probabilities in connection with expected 
utility, is doing the explanatory work. An expected utilities view which takes 
probabilities into account can, in addition, explain something the connection thesis 
cannot explain: why one should bet more on the second than on the first 
proposition.  
Compare a strong belief or conviction which doesn't amount to knowledge 
(let us assume "I won't win the lottery" is an example) with some piece of 
knowledge the subject is not nearly as certain of ("The Kopenhagen view on 
quantum mechanics is the right one"), assuming here that knowledge does not 
entail a probability of 1.51 It would be foolish not to bet more on the former than on 
the latter. This, again, suggests that what matters for practical reasoning is the 
subject’s probabilities or expected utility and not knowledge. An expected utilities 
account, again, has an explanatory advantage over the connection thesis here: It can 
explain why the subject should bet more on one proposition than on the other.  
Finally, suppose I have to decide whether to buy or not to buy a lottery 
ticket. Suppose further that neither do I know that the ticket offered will lose nor, 
of course, do I know that it will win. On the basis of what am I going to make my 
decision? Apparently not on the basis of knowledge concerning winning or losing.52 
My reasoning should be rather based on probabilities. – Apart from all this, 
Expected Utility can easily explain cases of Gettierization, false belief, lacking 
knowledge that one knows and false but justified belief that one knows (see 
sections 2-4 above).  
                                                                      
even if all the evidence has been checked, it would still not be appropriate to bet one’s life on 
the trivial conditional. 
51 If one disagrees here, holding that knowledge that p entails a probability of 1 for p, then this 
example will not work. However, this kind of defense is costly: One has to make very 
controversial and not intuitively plausible assumptions about knowledge and probability in 
order to defend a thesis, the connection thesis, which is supposed to be intuitively plausible. It 
is in general not a good strategy to defend the (allegedly) plausible with reference to the 
controversial. See also Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, “Critical Study of John Hawthorne’s 
Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley’s Knowledge and Practical Interests,” Noûs 43 
(2009): 185. 
52 Hawthorne, Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” 581, fn.10, mentions this point shortly without 
discussing it. 
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(c) Consider a certain kind of epistemological scepticism which does not so 
much raise doubts about the existence of the external world but rather denies that 
anyone ever knows anything in particular about the world. Knowledge, according 
to this kind of scepticism, requires that we meet a condition (e.g., to be able to rule 
out that we are dreaming at the moment) which we cannot meet, given our actual 
constitution. Call this “scepticism.” Now, either it is (metaphysically) possible or 
not possible that scepticism is true. Suppose the defender of the connection thesis 
accepts that there is a possible world in which scepticism is true. Perhaps we do 
know lots of things in the actual world but would fall short of the conditions for 
knowledge in some possible world. Would we then (in that possible world) never 
be entitled to practical reasoning concerning what to do in the world? This seems 
very implausible53; however, the defender of the connection thesis would, it seems, 
have to say exactly that – if he allows for the possibility of scepticism being true. 
The only alternative is to deny the latter and argue that scepticism is necessarily 
false. This, however, looks like a very strong thesis in need of much argument, and 
the connection thesis itself does not provide such an argument (neither does the 
general account of knowledge Hawthorne or Stanley favour). Hence, if the 
defender of the connection thesis does not want to go with the first, rather 
implausible option, they will have to accept a very substantial and controversial 
thesis concerning scepticism which is very much in need of argumentative support. 
This does, of course, not show that the connection thesis is false but it reduces its 
attractiveness drastically. One would first have to decide whether scepticism is 
necessarily false before one can reach a view about the connection thesis. 
Another problem arises with respect to morality. Moral reasoning is an 
important type of practical reasoning. I will keep my remarks short here, also 
because the defenders of the connection thesis have said (next to) nothing about 
this aspect. Consider the following plausible piece of moral reasoning: 
(1) That person is in need of my help 
(2) If someone is in need of my help, then (given certain background conditions), I 
ought to (better) help that person 
(3) Hence, I ought to (better) help that person.54 
                                                                 
53 See Dougherty, Knowledge and Context-Sensitive Norms, who argues that a subject in a 
sceptical scenario would have a justified false belief but her practical reasoning would remain 
unaffected; see also a brief passage in Kvanvig, “Against Pragmatic Encroachment,” 81. 
54 The background conditions mentioned here are of the following sort: I can help easily, there 
are no strong reasons not to help that person, etc. We can disregard these complexities here.  
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If the connection thesis also covers moral reasoning and not just instrumental 
reasoning and if it requires knowledge not just of the factual premises but also of 
the normative ones, then the connection thesis implies that some form of moral 
cognitivism must be true: The reasoner in our example needs to know the 
normative premises (e.g., (2)), too. Normative premises are knowable and truth-apt. 
If only the moral expressivists had known about the relation between knowledge 
and practical reasoning! But can a thesis in epistemology really have substantial 
implications in meta-ethics like moral non-cognitivism? We have good reason to be 
sceptical here. 
To conclude, one should not expect decisive arguments in the debate about 
the relation between knowledge, practical reasoning and action. The considerations 
offered here, however, make a strong case against the connection thesis. It remains 
to be seen whether the defenders of the connection thesis can come up with 
convincing replies. 
 
